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Abstract
Online labor markets experienced a rapid growth in recent years. They allow for
long-distance transactions and offer workers access to a potentially ‘global’ pool of
labor demand. As such, they bear the potential to act as a substitute for shrink-
ing local income opportunities. Using detailed U.S. data from a large online labor
platform for microtasks, we study how local unemployment affects participation
and work intensity online. We find that, at the extensive margin, an increase in
commuting zone level unemployment is associated with more individuals joining
the platform and becoming active in fulfilling tasks. At the intensive margin, our
results show that with higher unemployment rates, online labor supply becomes
more elastic. These results are driven by a decrease of the reservation wage during
standard working hours. Finally, the effects are transient and do not translate to
a permanent increase in platform participation by incumbent users. Our findings
highlight that many workers consider online labor markets as a substitute to of-
fline work for generating income, especially in periods of low local labor demand.
However, the evidence also suggests that, despite their potential to attract workers,
online markets for microtasks are currently not viable as a long run alternative for
most workers.
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1 Introduction
Online labor markets (OLM) bear the promise of mitigating persistent frictions in
oﬄine labor markets caused by distance, transaction costs, skill mismatch, and limited
geographic mobility of labor. By overcoming these barriers, OLM could reduce interre-
gional inequality and contribute to economic growth, which is of interest to many policy
makers.
The defining feature of OLM is that the product of labor is delivered entirely online
(Horton, 2010), which allows for transactions over long distances between a potentially
global pool of employers and employees. These markets are typically characterized by
low entry barriers and in many cases offer jobs with low complexity, which do not require
specialized skills. These features suggest that OLM could be attractive for underemployed
or individuals who lost their job or local opportunities for employment in their local labor
market.
In this paper, we study how local unemployment in the U.S. affects the adoption of and
activity on a large online labor platform for microtasks (Microworkers.com). To study this
question, we combine data from the microworking platform with unemployment statistics
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. To identify the effect of local unemployment on plat-
form activity at the extensive and intensive margin, we exploit variation in unemployment
at the commuting zone level in a set of fixed-effects panel regressions. Moreover, we use
Bartik-style instrumental variables (IV) to instrument for local unemployment.
A main strength of our analysis is the fact that we use internal platform data from a
large U.S.-based online labor market for microtasks which we can aggregate to the level of
regional labor markets. Specifically, we use all data on platform activity by U.S. workers in
the period from 2011 to 2015. Platforms for microtasks are highly suitable for the purpose
of our analysis, because they constitute a major segment of OLM. Their main service is
to allow for online ‘mini contracts’ between the employers and employees for performing
relatively small and simple tasks which typically result from breaking down larger projects
and business processes. Firms can submit orders that involve a large amount of similar
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‘microtasks’, such as image classification, to a crowd of interested workers. They also
track the completion of tasks and submit payments, thus mediating the labor contract
between employers and workers. The value created by these platforms appears to be high
enough to ensure a steady growth of OLM over the last decade in terms of participants,
transactions and variety of jobs mediated.
Our analysis of the relationship between unemployment and participation in the plat-
form documents two main findings. First, at the extensive margin, an increase in com-
muting zone level unemployment is associated with more individuals joining the platform
and becoming active in fulfilling tasks. The number of incumbent users engaging in tasks
is unaffected though. Second, at the intensive margin, our results show that with higher
unemployment rates, online labor supply becomes more elastic. We additionally find that
our results are driven by a decrease of the reservation wage during standard working
hours.
Previous studies analyzed the individual motivations to participate in OLM (e.g. Hor-
ton and Chilton, 2010; Ross et al., 2010; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Ipeirotis, 2010) and the
potential of online markets in overcoming geographic boundaries on an international scale
(Agrawal et al., 2015; Gefen and Carmel, 2008). However, very few studies analyze the
relationship between oﬄine economic fluctuations and participation in OLM. Our study
helps to fill this gap, providing insights into the potential of OLM to integrate local labor
markets and act countercyclical on a subnational scale.
In the following, Section 2 connects the paper to related literature. Section 3 gives
a short introduction to online labor platforms and microtasking and a description of the
platform Microworkers.com. Section 4 discusses our empirical approach and Section 5 the
data set. Section 6 and 7 report results, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to several streams of the economic literature. A first major
stream has sought to understand the drivers for the recent surge in OLM. This literature
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has mainly investigated the employees’ motives, demographics and working conditions.
We contribute by analyzing the role of unemployment for the supply of online labor. We
furthermore contribute to the literature investigating the role of online intermediaries
in integrating regional (labor) markets. In addition, our study is closely related to the
literature interested in the labor supply to flexible and temporary work and the value of
flexible work. Finally, we contribute to the literature of online time-use by highlighting
to which extent variations in unemployment leads to online self-employment.
Our main contribution consists of analyzing to which extent activity in online micro-
tasking is driven by local unemployment. We thus highlight the potential of OLM to
counterbalance regional economic downturns and mitigate interregional economic dispar-
ities. In contrast to other online activities, crowdworking, i.e. the participation in OLM,
offers participants explicit monetary rewards. This feature generates additional oppor-
tunities to earn income that complements oﬄine labor markets. Although crowdworking
markets for microtasks are known to yield a low level of earnings in comparison to the
wage level in high-income countries, several studies suggest a high relevance of the direct
compensation for participation in these markets (Kaufmann et al., 2011; Teodoro et al.,
2014; Ipeirotis, 2010; Ross et al., 2010; Schnitzer et al., 2015).1 Horton and Chilton (2010)
provide direct evidence on remunerations and earning targets in crowdworking platforms.2
Earnings on crowdworking platforms are found to be generally highly skewed (Agrawal et
al., 2015; Hirth et al., 2011; Musthag and Ganesan, 2013), and average earnings largely
depend on the nature and complexity of the tasks (Agrawal et al., 2015).3 Overall, existing
1Most of the evidence is available for the platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which is com-
parable to Microworkers.com in terms of nature of the tasks and payments. In a survey on participation
motives conducted on MTurk by Kaufmann et al. (2011) direct compensation is the most important
motive. Similarly, Teodoro et al. (2014) find the desire for monetary compensation to be among the main
driver for engagement in an on-demand mobile crowdworking platform. However, Ipeirotis (2010) shows
that most among U.S. participants on MTurk consider their work on the platform only as a secondary
source of income. In a further survey conducted by Ross et al. (2010), around 10 percent of the US-based
participants of MTurk indicate that they rely on the crowdworking income to make ends meet, while
around one quarter of the participants indicate that the income is a way to pay for nice extras.
2Horton and Chilton (2010) estimate the reservation wage of a sample of crowdworkers on MTurk.
They find that the median reservation wage is $1,38 per hour, which also indicates that non-pecuniary
motives for participation might also play a role for some users. In addition, the authors suggest that a
non-trivial fraction of crowdworkers set earnings targets.
3Ross et al. (2010), for instance, discuss that on MTurk weekly earnings above $100 are achieved only
by 1 percent of the participants. Exploiting data from the online labor platform oDesk (now Upwork),
Agrawal et al. (2015) show that average earnings do largely depend on the nature and complexity of
3
studies suggest that remuneration is a strong motive for platform participation, even for
online labor in the context of microtasks.4 On the other hand, findings on low reservation
wages and average earnings in markets for microtasks indicate that OLM for microtasks,
rarely (completely) substitute oﬄine income. We address this debate by working with
observational data and exploiting the variation in the local unemployment rate as shifter
of the commuting zone’s labor supply on the platform.
Whereas the relevance of compensation has been carefully documented, there is little
evidence that relies on exogenous (to the platform) shifters of either wages or the labor
supply. A notable exception is the study by Farrell and Greig (2016), who provide first
suggestive evidence that individuals resort to OLM after negative income shocks. For
their descriptive analysis, the authors used anonymized checking accounts data. Using
data from a survey on MTurk and Crowdflower, Berg (2015) suggests that about one
third of crowdworkers were unemployed prior to their engagement in online labor. A
working paper by Cowgill and Horton (2018) focuses on participation in the Russian
online labor market as a consequence of variations in the exchange rate and the ensuing
changes in wage. Clearly, OLM could be particularly attractive for under- and unemployed
individuals, because they offer jobs with low entry barriers, and often times jobs with
low complexity, which require no specialized skills (Kuek et al., 2015). Most similar to
our paper, Huang et al. (2017) use an identification strategy based on mass layoffs that
differentially affect the online and other industries. They focus on freelancers and complex
‘macrotasks’, such as software development. In contrast to platforms for microtasks,
the market analyzed involves considerably higher entry barriers, due to the need for
specialized skills to perform the tasks. Moreover, more complex jobs and projects are
typically available only once, whereas microtasks are made available in great number and
thus create income opportunities for more individuals. Their results thus complement our
the tasks performed. Thus, average hourly earnings for software engineering tasks are $16 and therefore
twice the respective earnings for translation tasks. Similar differences in remunerations depending on
task category have been documented for Microworkers.com by Hirth et al. (2011).
4Besides monetary incentives, the literature also highlights the importance of intrinsic motives for
crowdworking (e.g. Brabham, 2010). Of particular relevance is the bigger autonomy with respect to the
working time, the place, the content and the targeted earnings. Also, crowdworking provides opportunities
to improve personal skills and experience. Finally, Ipeirotis (2010) highlights that crowdworking can also
be perceived as personal entertainment.
4
findings. What is completely missing however, is a systematic analysis of participation at
the extensive and intensive margin, and the implied wage elasticities for online workers.
We contribute to the scarce empirical evidence on the potentials of online interme-
diaries to integrate labor markets. Regional mobility of the labor force is an important
factor in equating interregional employment disparities and thus contributes to economic
growth. However, persistent frictions in oﬄine labor markets caused by distance and
transaction costs are often important barriers to geographic mobility of labor (Artuc et
al., 2015; Niebuhr et al., 2012). OLM have the potential to reduce such frictions and
notable previous research on this critical and policy relevant question are the studies
by Gefen and Carmel (2008) and Agrawal et al. (2015) with a focus on international
cross-border transactions. Gefen and Carmel (2008) investigate transactions in an online
programming marketplace for small IT projects. They find that employers tend to show
preferences for domestic providers. However, the authors also document that American
employers appear to be an exception to this finding, with higher preferences for offshore
providers. Agrawal et al. (2015) show descriptively that, the online labor market oDesk
is dominated by North-South exchange with employers being predominantly from high-
income countries and contractors mainly form low income countries. Both studies point
to the quality of OLM to foster cross-regional transactions on a global scale, which can be
expected to be largely driven by international differences in factor prices. Taken together,
these papers highlight how OLM contribute to the death of distance in international trade.
We add to this stream by highlighting the integration of markets on a sub-national scale
and studying its response to regional economic imbalances.
Our study is also related to the literature which is interested in quantifying the wage
elasticity of labor supply in the context of flexible and temporary work. A considerable
body of literature focuses on the labor supply decision of taxi drivers. This literature often
finds small or negative labor supply elasticities consistent with earnings targets (Farber,
2015; Camerer et al., 1997). A famous experimental study by Fehr and Goette (2007)
found higher wage elasticities of labor supply, but the increased supply of hours worked
was flanked by reduced effort provision. Based on their own analysis of data from the
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online labor platform MTurk as well as an evaluation of 5 experiments run on the platform,
Dube et al. (2018) document low labor supply elasticities of around 0.1, which they relate
to monopsony power on the marketplace. We can contribute new insight to this massive
stream of the literature, because our data set allows us to observe wage compensation
and labor supply at an extremely high resolution (at the task level). Specifically, we also
find low wage elasticities in general, but document considerably higher elasticities, when
unemployment is high.
A related strand investigates the value of workplace flexibility. Mas and Pallais (2017)
conduct a randomized experiment on the willingness to pay for schedule flexibility among
call-center applicants. They find that the majority of applicants are not willing to pay
for schedule flexibility, even though there is a considerable right tail of workers with high
valuation. Chen et al. (2017) estimate the variation of the reservation wage of Uber drivers
between hours. Simulating driver surplus, the authors find that Uber drivers benefit from
the flexibility provided by on-demand online labor. We show how the supply of flexible
online labor on OLM changes with unemployment. We thus contribute new insight on
the role of local shocks to unemployment as another possibly important factor that might
contribute to the transition to more flexible labor markets.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on online time usage by showing how the aggre-
gate supply of labor on OLM changes over time of the day as unemployment increases. The
literature suggests that young people (Wallsten, 2013) as well as poorer people (Goldfarb
and Prince, 2008) spend more time online. At times of economic crisis both these groups
of population are in danger of staying persistently unemployed and facing a subsequent
decrease in their income. Our study adds to this literature by showing that individuals
turn to OLM while spending time on their computers.
To summarize, it remains unclear whether or not the online labor market can serve
as an alternative to oﬄine labor markets. Specifically, more research is needed to explore
the extent to which OLM interact and counterbalance macroeconomic fluctuations on a
sub-national scale.
We aim at narrowing this gap by contributing the first comprehensive study that
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combines statistical U.S. data on commuting zone level unemployment with proprietary
data from a microtasking platform. In addition, we provide a unified framework for
relating both the number of participating users (extensive margin) and the amount of
supplied labor (intensive margin) to the current rate of unemployment. This framework
allows us to document how increased unemployment affects the labor supply elasticity.
We thus inform both policy makers and stakeholders in online labor platforms about the
potentials and shortcomings of OLM for microtasks to serve as a backup for workers in
regions that experience negative shocks to labor demand.
3 Microtasking Platforms
3.1 Online Labor Platforms and Microtasking
The advent of OLM was marked by Amazon launching their platform MTurk in 2005.
Ever since, the market for online labor has steadily grown. Aggregating information
from the ten most important platforms, Frei (2009) estimated that by 2009 about $700
million had been earned by individuals in OLM. In 2012, the World Bank estimated the
global market size for microtasking in particular to be between $450 and $900 million
annually, with an overall employment between 1.45 and 2.9 million workers (Rossotto et
al., 2012). The Financial Times estimated the overall crowdworking market to be worth
$1 billion annually by 2012 (Agrawal et al., 2015). More recently, several studies have
taken different approaches to assess the economic relevance of OLM for the U.S. Harris
and Krueger (2015) indirectly try to estimated the number of individuals engaging in
online labor based on search queries. Farrell and Greig (2017) identify online workers
through transfers by major online labor platforms to their bank accounts. Katz and
Krueger (2016) provide an estimate based on a representative online survey. Applying a
broad definition of online mediated labor, including platforms for physical tasks provided
locally, these studies uniformly find that between 0.4 and 0.5 percent of the U.S. labor
force actively provided services over such platforms in 2015 and 2016.
Historically, online labor platforms started with the mediation of microtasks, i.e.
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small and repetitive tasks which can be performed quickly, such as writing small texts,
recognizing pictures, providing transcriptions or verifying the accuracy of data. Several
surveys are aimed at better understanding the demographic characteristics of users on
online labor platforms (Ipeirotis, 2010; Ross et al., 2010; Martin et al., 2017). Martin et
al. (2017) discuss that most demographic studies on MTurk find the majority of workers
to be U.S. based (50%-60%). Based on their own survey conducted on the platforms
MTurk, Crowdee and Microworkers.com, and in line with other studies on the topic, the
authors show that most crowdworkers across platforms exhibit a high eduction level with
a with a college or advanced degree and that online labor platforms tend to be dominated
by male workers.
As the overall market for online labor has grown, platform heterogeneity has increased.
This refers to both the nature of mediated labor and how the competing markets differ
in critical aspects of their design such as payment models or competition. By now, the
variety of tasks in OLM is much larger and ranges from very simple microtasks up to
completing complex design or IT projects with substantial budgets and long durations.
Platforms for microtasks differ from markets for complex tasks in various ways other than
job complexity. The study by Agrawal et al. (2015) allows insights into how the platform
oDesk mediates more complex jobs such as software development or customer services and
sales and marketing jobs. For instance, rather than paying a fixed rate per microtask,
oDesk also supports hourly wages. Moreover, employers can interview job applicants and
negotiate the wages.
3.2 Description of Microworkers.com
Microworkers.com was launched in May, 2009. It is a ‘classical’ online platform for
microtasks, with jobs ranging form writing reviews and articles to click and search tasks.5
In contrast to many other online labor platforms, users of Microworkers.com have only
one login and can act as both, worker and employer. Payments are conducted via online
micro-payment services, thus no bank account in a specific country is required. Tasks on
5For a detailed description of the platform see Hirth et al. (2011).
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Microworkers.com are organized in jobs and campaigns with one campaign consisting of
multiple jobs to be performed. On Microworkers.com there are predefined job categories
with different minimum payments depending on the complexity, time and effort required.
The individual jobs are paid between $0.10 and a few dollars. Types of tasks available
on Microworkers.com range from very small and simple tasks, such as search engine op-
timization, to software testing, surveys and slightly more complex tasks, such as writing
articles or audio transcripts. Hirth et al. (2011) document how earnings are highly depen-
dent on the complexity of the respective task. Over time, the range of supported tasks
has increased and especially more complex tasks have become available (Hirth, 2016).
To become active on the platform individuals have to register providing basic informa-
tion, such as their name and email address. Once registered by a verified email address,
individuals can view the marketplace and thus get information on the tasks that are
available to them. In order to start working, individuals additionally have to verify their
account by a phone number and a verification message. Employers can define eligible
worker groups based on basic characteristics, such as country of origin or platform rating.
Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the marketplace for a newly registered user. For each
task the user is provided with information on the payment, the success rate of previously
performed tasks in the campaign, the share of tasks in the campaign already done, the
estimated time it takes to finish the task (in minutes, based on employer information) and
the time the employer needs to rate the work output of the employee. Each tasks provides
detailed instructions and requirements upon which the individual can accept the task and
start working. After completing the tasks, the employer has the option to accept or reject
the work output or demand a revision. In case of acceptance, the employee gets paid.
Employees who feel they have been misrated can file a complaint, which is resolved by the
platform. The reputation system rates employees according to their success rate, which
is the relation of successful to non-successful tasks. To be able to continue performing
tasks, employees have to keep their success rate above 75 percent.
By 2016, Microworkers.com had about 800,000 registered user, who submitted over
261,000 campaigns and had completed over 26 million tasks (Hirth, 2016). Hirth et al.
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the Microworkers.com Marketplace
Account Owner Account Name
User Email
Account ID
Campaign Title
Campaign Title
Campaign Title
Campaign Title
Campaign Title
Campaign Title
Campaign Title
Campaign Title
Campaign Title
Note: Account details and campaign titles anonymized.
(2011) compare Microworkers.com to MTurk. Empirically, they find that the workers are
less U.S.-centered on Microworkers.com than on MTurk. Thus, working hours can be
different on average. However, U.S. citizens make up for one of the three biggest groups
on Microworkers.com, and we solely focus on this subgroup of workers. Further differences
relate to employers and hence the tasks demanded. Employers on Microworkers.com are
less concentrated in the sense that 10 percent of employers account for 70 percent of the
wage paid, compared to 90 percent of the wages paid on MTurk. Hirth et al. (2011)
argue that this is due to MTurk being used more by mediators for other companies while
on Microworkers.com employers are more often self-employed or use the platform for
marketing purposes. Hence, creative tasks are slightly less present on Microworkers.com
compared to MTurk. To sum up, Microworkers.com is conceptually a typical example of
a microtasking platform as MTurk. The platform matches demand for tasks to be solved
with supply of online workers, assures the fulfillment of tasks and facilitates the transfer
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of payments. The complexity of tasks is rather low and aimed to be done by a mass of
users rather than a one-to-one relationship.
4 Methodology
4.1 Model
Our analysis focuses on U.S. citizens performing tasks on the platform between 2011
and 2015, and our data originate directly from the platform’s records. Workers from
the U.S. make up for the third largest country share of workers on the platform. In our
empirical application, we are interested in the decision to work on the platform at the
extensive as well as at intensive margin. Therefore, we first describe a simple discrete
choice model of labor supply for the amount of work performed (intensive labor supply
model). Subsequently, we describe the decision of workers to register and become active
on the the platform.
Intensive labor supply model Wages on the platform are set by the task givers and
microworkers are therefore wage-takers. We argue that any labor force member of the
U.S. is a potential microworker. Any potential worker has a certain time endowment. It
is upon the potential workers to make a choice to dedicate a time unit to fulfill a task
on the platform. Each worker is willing to engage in doing some tasks on the platform
in exchange for money, depending on the wage and the associated disutility of doing the
task. The disutility of performing the task is inversely related to the reservation wage:
the reservation wage is higher for less attractive or more demanding tasks that require
more effort. (see also Chen et al., 2017). Both individual characteristics and the task type
affect the individual’s reservation wage. For instance, unemployed individuals could have
a lower reservation wage due to their lower alternative income possibilities. Thus, they
are more prone to spend time working on the platform. We assume that any participant
of the labor force in a given commuting zone makes a decision how to make use of each
time unit (measured by minutes) per quarter.
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To describe the decision of an individual to perform tasks in the online labor market,
we make use of the discrete choice literature (Berry, 1994). We model the potential
microworker i’s conditional indirect utility from performing a task of type j at each point
in time in a logit framework as
uij = Xijα + βwj + γwjURi,j + ξj + ij, (1)
where the variable wj denotes the wage per hour for task j which is set by the employer
submitting task j. Xij contains several observed task characteristics, commuting zone and
time fixed effects. ξj accounts for unobserved (by the econometrician) task characteristics.
The vector α captures valuations by individuals for task characteristics, β is the marginal
utility of wage when the unemployment rate, URi,j, is at zero, γ measures the perceived
additional utility of wage interacted with the unemployment rate. ij is as an i.i.d. extreme
value distributed error term. The outside option captures other work opportunities online
or oﬄine as well as the option of not working at all. The outside option is normalized so
that it has mean conditional utility of zero: ui0 = i0.
Applying the inversion steps suggested by Berry (1994) yields the following regression
equation
ln(sj)− ln(s0) = Xijα + βwj + γwjURj + ξj, (2)
which allows us to use aggregated data. Without taking into account the unemployment
rate, we expect β to have a positive sign, indicating that the remuneration contributes
positively to the utility of performing the task. Additionally, we expect that unemployed
have a higher utility when working on the platform as their outside option is less valuable
once they do not have a job anymore. This should translate into γ having a positive sign.
After estimating the model, we can calculate the own-wage elasticity of task supply
by
wj
sj
∂sj
∂wj
= ηw = (β + γURj)wj(1− sj). (3)
As we specify in more detail below, we obtain the data aggregated by task type,
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commuting zone and quarter. Two additional layers - hour of the day and day of the
week - are added later. We use this augmented data for robustness checks to show that
unemployment affects platform activity most in the morning, when most people work.
Entry to the platform In addition to the intensive labor supply model, we also study
the decision to work on the platform at the extensive margin. For this, we slightly adapt
the model in Equation (2). Now, the choice set J only consists of the outside option and
joining the platform (the coefficient for task wage is omitted), such that
uEntryi,j = Xi,jα + βURi,j + ξj + i,j, (4)
and we estimate
ln(sjEntry)− ln(s0Entry) = Xjα + βURi + ξjEntry, (5)
where se,j is the share of individuals who register on the platform or perform at least
one task in the quarter studied. We estimate Equation (5) for the number of newly
registered and the number of active users, differentiated by newly active and incumbent
users. The corresponding own-unemployment elasticity of online labor supply at the
extensive margin is given by
URj
sj
∂sj
∂URj
= ηUR = βURj(1− sj). (6)
4.2 Identification
Unobserved heterogeneity between commuting zones and shocks on the na-
tional level over time In order to mitigate a potential omitted-variable bias, we
exploit the panel property of our data and include commuting zone fixed effects. We
thus eliminate all variation in platform activity caused by time-invariant unobserved het-
erogeneity between local labor markets. Shocks at the national level and the potential
ongoing adoption process on the platform is captured by the most conservative definition
13
of time dummies as quarter fixed effects.
Endogeneity of wage As the online wage is an equilibrium outcome one could object
that it is endogenous. However, online wages are set by the employers in the global
(worldwide) market. As we use data on the commuting zone level, it is reasonable to
assume that the effect of the local commuting zone wage level on the equilibrium online
wage on the platform is negligible. Instead, as labor supply to the platform within one
commuting zone is small compared to the total (worldwide) labor supply on the platform,
we assume that individuals within a commuting zone face a perfectly inelastic labor
demand.
Endogeneity of unemployment Unemployment might not only vary due to changes
in local labor demand, but could equally well be due to labor supply shocks and thus be
correlated e.g. with demographics (age-, skill structure). Trends in unemployment and
participation in OLM could also be mutually driven by other commuting zone-specific
characteristics which vary over time, such as digital infrastructure. When local labor
market conditions get worse, young individuals might be driven out of the region. If
younger individuals are also more likely to engage in online work, then our estimates
would be downward biased. If economic hardship results in worse internet infrastructure,
which is needed to work online, then our estimates would be upward biased. In contrast,
endogeneity due to reverse causation is highly unlikely due to the still minor economic
relevance of any single online labor platform to date.
In order to mitigate potential endogeneity of unemployment, we follow a standard
approach in the literature on local labor market conditions and use Bartik, or ‘shift
share’ instruments.6 As an instrumental variable for local unemployment we construct a
measure of plausibly exogenous labor demand shocks. For that, we interact predetermined
cross-sectional differences in the industrial composition within a local labor market with
6This approach goes back to Bartik (1991) and has been used extensively in studies on local labor
demand (e.g. Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Autor and Duggan, 2003; Autor et al.,
2013; Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016; Adelino et al., 2017) or migration (e.g. Altonji and Card, 1991). In
particular, Gould et al. (2002); Fouge`re et al. (2009) or Brown and De Cao (2017) use Bartik shocks to
identify causal effects of local unemployment.
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national changes in industry employment (excluding own region employment). Formally,
the local labor demand shock is constructed as
pict =
K∑
k=1
γc,k,t0
(
E−c,k,t − E−c,k,t−1
E−c,k,t−1
)
(7)
where γc,k,t0 is the employment share of industry k in commuting zone c and base period
t0 and E−c,k,t is the respective national employment in period t excluding commuting
zone c. We construct this Bartik shock at the 4-digit NAICS level according to the
above equation. In order to construct pre-determined industry shares we use the year
2010 as base period. The concept behind this identification strategy is that when certain
industries experience a nation-wide shock, some regions are affected more strongly due
to their preexisting economic structure. Nation-wide industry growth excluding the focal
commuting zone is plausibly exogenous due to the small size of individual commuting
zones relative to the whole of the U.S. While the initial industry structure might be
correlated with unobservable regional characteristics, we rely on predetermined, time
invariant industry shares and control for commuting zone fixed effects in all our models.
5 The Data
5.1 Data Set Creation
Sources We want to assess the impact of a rise in unemployment in a local labor
market on the participation on the online labor platform. We thus generate a data
set combining information on platform activity with administrative data on economic
activity in local labor markets. We use data on registrations and task completion by U.S.
workers on Microworkers.com, which is based directly on the platform’s internal data
base. Although the platform was launched in 2009, we only use data from January, 2011
on to avoid that our results are confounded by early life-cycle features of the platform.
We add data on the local labor force and unemployment, which stem form the Local Area
Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Data on wages
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and employment by industry are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). We complement this data with information
on local demographics from the Annual County Resident Population Estimates by the
U.S. Census Bureau.7
Aggregation In order to have a meaningful delineation of local labor markets, we
aggregate the data to commuting zones. These are defined by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture in order to represent local labor markets (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996; Autor et
al., 2013) and have become a widely used unit of observation in research on labor markets.
They are constructed as clusters of counties with strong commuting ties within and weak
commuting ties across commuting zones. Based on the regional mobility of workers, they
are a more appealing definition of local labor markets than other alternatives, such as
counties or metropolitan statistical areas.8 In the U.S. there are 709 commuting zones.
We drop 52 commuting zones without any activity on the platform and thus arrive at a
sample of 657 local labor markets. We use quarters as our primary observational time unit.
We observe each commuting zone over 20 quarters from January 2011 until December
2015, leaving us with 13140 commuting zone-quarter observations.
Additional panel dimensions As outlined in Section 4.1 we create three main data
sets with different panel dimensions for the three types of analysis we conduct. For our
analysis at the extensive margin, where we model the decision of individuals within a
commuting zone to enter the platform, we create a panel where the unit of observation
is the commuting zone by quarter. We use this data to model the choice to register
and become active on the platform according to Equation (5). For the analysis at the
intensive margin, where we model the task supply by individuals within the commuting
7Local demographics data at the county level are only available at the yearly basis. Given that
demographic characteristics have low variation over time, we linearly interpolate the yearly data in order
to match them to our quarterly data.
8For the aggregation of county level data to commuting zones, we use the 2000 version of the crosswalk
files provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. We manually updated the crosswalk file to match
regional identifiers in our administrative data up to the year 2016 using publicly available information
by the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and by David Dorn at
http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm.
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zone according to Equation (2), we additionally aggregate the platform data by task type.
In particular, we distinguish between three types of tasks depending on how much effort
is needed to finish the task: low, medium and high complexity. We assign low complexity
to tasks that require few clicks and a short amount of time. These are, for example,
providing an email address, signing up, image quality rating, or bookmark a page. To
medium complexity we assign such tasks as writing a short comment to somebody’s post
or a short post on own timeline of Facebook, or write a short comment. These tasks do not
typically require more than 5 minutes. Finally, highly complex tasks are those requiring
longer than 5 minutes time for their accomplishment and a certain level of creativity, for
example: write a post on a forum and provide a link, make a video or audio transcription
or translation.
In Section 7.1, we conduct an analysis by the time of the day. We therefore construct
a panel by quarter and commuting zone with the additional panel dimensions being the
day of the week and the hour of the day.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the regressors and outcome variables used
in the analysis. For reasons of confidentiality, all variables containing information on the
platform are normalized with respect to their maximum value (over all commuting zones
and time) in the sample (and are therefore defined between 0 and 1). “New registrants”
is the number of new users in a specific commuting zone and quarter. Active users are
defined as those who perform at least one task in the relevant quarter. In addition, we
further distinguish between users who are newly active (for the first time) in the respective
quarter and those who had already been active in previous quarters.
We furthermore measure the total number of working hours (Working hours), the
number of tasks performed within a state (Tasks done) and the total payments earned by
employees within a state (Paid reward). As the actual working hours are not observable,
we measure total working hours by the time which the employer indicated the tasks
would take when posting the campaign. Due to differences in the size of commuting
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
New registrants 0.02 0.06 0.00 1.00
Active Users 0.02 0.06 0.00 1.00
Active Users (new) 0.02 0.05 0.00 1.00
Active Users (old) 0.02 0.05 0.00 1.00
Tasks 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Working Hours 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00
Wage sum 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00
Population (Mio.) 0.39 0.78 0.01 8.70
Oﬄine wage 9.63 1.90 6.26 26.28
Unemployed (Mio.) 0.02 0.05 0.00 1.08
Employed (Mio.) 0.22 0.56 0.00 8.49
Labor Force (Mio.) 0.24 0.60 0.00 9.04
Unemployment Rate 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.29
% age 15-24 (i) 0.24 0.03 0.15 0.45
% age 25-44 (i) 0.41 0.03 0.28 0.54
% age 45-64 (i) 0.35 0.04 0.23 0.51
% male (i) 0.50 0.02 0.46 0.59
% white (i) 0.84 0.14 0.11 0.99
Observations 13140
Note: This table shows the summary statistics for 20 quarterly observations of our
main variables of interest for 657 commuting zones. The variables are organized in
two groups: (1) Aggregate participation and activity of U.S. residents on Microwork-
ers.com. Active users performed at least one task in the respective quarter, and all
indicators are normalized by the maximum value of each indicator respectively. (2)
Demographic characteristics for the commuting zones in our data set. (i) Yearly
data linearly interpolated to the quarterly level.
zones, the sample values for platform activity are highly skewed. Standard deviations for
the measures of the number of users, registered and active users are higher than for the
measures of volume.
There is a substantial number of commuting zones with zero activity. We deal with
this in the following way. For the analysis of the extensive margin, we add one worker
for all variables in order to be able to compute an odds-ratio. Therefore, we have a
balanced panel for the number of newly registered users. For the active users, we only use
commuting zones with a positive stock of registered users. For the analysis of the intensive
margin, we use a sample of commuting zones where we could measure activity. Robustness
analyses here show that the inclusion of zero activity commuting zones increases statistical
power of instruments while leaving the results qualitatively unchanged.
The average commuting zone in our estimation sample has a population size of 0.39
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million, with a labor size of 0.24 million of which on average 0.02 million are unem-
ployed. The average unemployment rate in our sample is around 7 percent. Regarding
demographics, we report three age groups with the middle group being between 25 and
44 being on average the largest. The average share of males is at 50 percent, while on
average 84 percent are white. Finally, the average quarterly wages per employee in the
commuting zone are at 9.63 thousand U.S. Dollars.
5.3 Activity on the Platform and Unemployment
Figure 2: Aggregate Participation and Activity of U.S. Residents on Microworkers.com.
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Note: This figure displays the aggregate participation and activity of U.S. residents
on Microworkers.com. Active users are defined as users that performed at least one
task in the respective quarter. All indicators are normalized by the maximum value
of each indicator respectively.
To better understand the extent of variation in the data across commuting zones or
states, and over time, we report several figures on platform activity and unemployment.
Figure 2 shows different measures for activities of U.S. users on the platform from the
beginning of 2011 to the end of 2015. The number of newly registered users and the
number of new active users follow a similar pattern. This suggests that most users who
register perform their first tasks in the same month. The right panel of Figure 2 indicates
that both the number of new and old active users were growing until 2014 and saw a
small decrease in 2015. Figure 3 shows the distribution of registered user over commuting
zones. The map plots quintiles of total registered user over our observation period. As
expected, activity in the online labor market is concentrated at the east and the west
coast of the U.S.
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In what follows, we show a visual analysis of the variation in unemployment and
registration rates at the platform over time. Our main data is at the commuting zone
level. However, for improved visualization and readability, we aggregated these variables
at the state and monthly level.
Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Registered User
Note:The map plots quintiles of total registered user over the observation
period. Dark regions belong to the highest quintile and light regions to the
lowest.
Figure 4 shows the variation in the data at the state level. The left panel shows the
unemployment rates and the right panel shows the number of users that registered on
Microworkers.com. State-level unemployment rates were on an overall downward trend
over the five year period, but we also observe a considerable variation across states over
time, especially when comparing the 10th and the 90th percentiles to the median state.
The right panel shows the number of newly registered users on Microworkers.com. To
account for state size effects, new users are shown as a share of the state’s labor force.
The registration rate varies substantially across states and it shows a positive trend.
Moreover, both measures, unemployment and registrations, exhibit a seasonal pattern.
While the overall median trend of both series suggests a negative relationship, the plotted
series do not account for differences in the baseline unemployment rates between states.
We further provide a better insight on the variation in the data by calculating the
deviation of the state-level unemployment rate from the state-level average in the obser-
vation period and compare this to the registrations. In Figure 5, we plot the deviation of
the unemployment rate from the state specific mean against the state-specific registration
rate. The figure shows that in months with high relative unemployment the number of
registrations tends to be higher as well. The correlation coefficient between both variables
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Figure 4: State-level Unemployment and Registrations on Microworkers.com.
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Note: This figure displays the percentiles of the unemployment rates and the
registration rate on Microworkers.com. It also indicates outliers above the highest
and below the lowest 10th percentile. Registration rates are calculated as the number
of registrations divided by the labor force. They are normalized by the maximum
value of all states over time.
is 0.55. The positive association in Figure 5 provides a first descriptive evidence for the
relevance of local unemployment for platform participation.
Figure 5: Unemployment Rates and Corresponding Registrations on Microworkers.com.
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Note: This figure plots deviations form the state-specific average unemployment
rate on the horizontal axis against the (normalized) state-specific registration rates
on the vertical axis.
21
6 Main Results
We present three sets of findings. First, we analyze the effect of unemployment on
the participation of new users or the extensive margin (Subsection 6.1). We use simple
OLS fixed effects and Bartik IV methods. In Subsection 6.2 we analyze the intensive
margin, that is the hours that users worked on the platform. In Section 7 we explore the
robustness and heterogeneities in the effects across demographic groups and hours of the
day.
6.1 Extensive Margin Labor Supply
To estimate how unemployment affects entry of workers to the platform we estimate
Equation 5 from Section 4. That is, we analyze the effect of unemployment on the partici-
pation on the platform, using our data on all commuting zones. To quantify participation,
we focus on user registrations and user activity in commuting zone i and period t. Ta-
ble 2 shows the regression results. All regressions are OLS fixed effects regressions and
the dependent variable measures the odds-ratio of newly registered users (Col. (1)), all
active users on the platform (Col. (2)). In Columns 3 and 4 we distinguish between active
users who registered to the platform and performed tasks within the quarter (Col. (3))
and active users who already performed tasks in an earlier quarters (Col. (4)).
We find a strong positive relationship between registrations and unemployment and
a weakly significant positive relationship between the number of active users and unem-
ployment (cf. Col. 2), which is driven by new active users rather than existing users (Col.
3 and 4). In line with expectations, the relationship between the local level of oﬄine
wages are negatively associated with registrations and the number of active users. These
findings suggest that with an increase in unemployment, more users register and perform
at least one task. In our OLS fixed effects regressions, we find rather moderate elastici-
ties. These suggest that a one percent increase in the unemployment rate, is associated
with a 0.09 percent increase in number of newly registered user and the number of active
user. Similarly, a one percent increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.11
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Table 2: Results on the Extensive Margin
Reg. Users Active Users Active Users (New) Active Users (Old)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Rate 1.314∗∗∗ 1.671∗ 2.091∗∗ 0.221
(0.508) (0.896) (0.888) (0.920)
Oﬄine wage -0.054∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.023∗ 0.009
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
% age 15-24 (i) -6.563∗∗∗ 0.274 2.026 -3.172
(1.558) (3.132) (2.864) (3.777)
% age 45-64 (i) -0.161 4.467 1.651 10.809∗∗
(1.726) (3.990) (3.515) (4.405)
% male (i) -4.215 -13.393 -7.737 -18.540
(4.170) (10.561) (9.803) (11.615)
% white (i) 4.336∗ -13.004∗∗ -11.981∗∗ -23.946∗∗∗
(2.339) (5.146) (4.643) (5.908)
Constant -10.055∗∗∗ 15.383∗ 12.136∗ 25.360∗∗∗
(3.270) (7.922) (7.288) (8.936)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 Overall 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
R2 Within 0.08 0.58 0.63 0.61
Observations 13140 10950 10950 10950
UR elasticity 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.01
Oﬄ. Wage elast. -0.52 -0.16 -0.17 0.07
Note: The table analyzes the relationship of unemployment and user participation on Mi-
croworkers.com. The dependent variable measures the odds-ratio of newly registered users (Col.
(1)), all active users on the platform (Col. (2)). Columns 3 and 4 separately consider newly reg-
istered users who were active in the quarter (Col. (3)) and active users who already performed
tasks in past quarters (Col. (4)). All regressions are OLS fixed effects regressions. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by commuting zone and are robust to heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
percent increase in users who perform tasks during their first quarter on the platform. As
for the labor supply elasticity with respect to the oﬄine wage level, we find that a one
percent increase in oﬄine wages relates to a decrease in the number of newly registered
users by 0.52 percent and a decrease in the number of newly active users by 0.17 percent.
Identification of the Effect of Unemployment with Bartik IVs In Table 3 we
revisit the analysis of the extensive margin (Equation 5 from Section 4), but we account
for the endogeneity of the unemployment rate and use Bartik shocks to instrument un-
employment, as outlined in Section 4.2. When we use this instrumentation strategy, all
signs of the previous regressions are confirmed. Unemployment continues to have a sta-
tistically significant effect on registrations and the number of newly active users, and the
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Table 3: Results on the Extensive Margin, Instrumented with Bartik IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg. Users Active Users Active Users (New) Active Users (Old)
Unemployment Rate 11.385∗∗ 7.888 12.643∗∗ 8.440
(3.993) (6.475) (6.199) (6.019)
Oﬄine wage -0.048∗∗ -0.016 -0.013 0.016
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
% age 15-24 (i) -7.150∗∗ 0.356 2.166 -3.064
(1.820) (3.166) (2.923) (3.860)
% age 45-64 (i) 1.933 5.448 3.317 12.107∗∗
(2.103) (4.084) (3.667) (4.552)
% male (i) -13.599∗∗ -23.004 -24.047 -31.245∗∗
(6.515) (15.336) (14.716) (15.488)
% white (i) 9.264∗∗ -10.303∗ -7.397 -20.375∗∗
(3.381) (6.191) (5.797) (6.671)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13140 10945 10945 10945
Kleibergen-Paap Stat 27.02 18.05 18.05 18.05
UR elasticity 0.80 0.40 0.67 0.46
Oﬄ. Wage elast. -0.46 -0.12 -0.10 0.13
Note: This table replicates Table 2 but instruments local unemployment with Bartik instru-
ments. The dependent variable measures the odds-ratio of newly registered users (Col. (1)), all
active users on the platform (Col. (2)). Columns 3 and 4 separately consider newly registered
users who were active in the quarter (Col. (3)) and active users who already performed tasks
in past quarters (Col. (4)). All regressions are two stage least squares fixed effects regressions.
First stage results are provided in Table A.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
commuting zone and are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01.
oﬄine wage level is negatively associated with user registrations. The effect of unem-
ployment on the number of total active users however, is not statistically significant any
more at conventional levels. We note that using Bartik IV to account for endogeneity of
local unemployment considerably increases the magnitude of the labor supply elasticity
with respect to unemployment compared to the OLS estimates. However, the elasticities
remain below one and within reasonable range. According to our IV estimates, a one
percent increase in local unemployment leads to a 0.8 percent increase in the number of
newly registered user and a 0.67 percent increase of newly active users in the OLM.
6.2 Intensive Margin Labor Supply
We now turn to the analysis of the intensive margin of labor supply. This implies
studying how local unemployment affects the hours that users devote to working on the
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platform. For this, we estimate the model described in Equation 2 of Section 4. We
use a data set with one additional panel dimension, the task categories according to
their complexity. The dependent variable is the odds-ratio of hours worked. We exclude
commuting zones without active users, given that only active users can vary their hours
worked on the platform.
In Column (1) of Table 4, we estimate the model with OLS fixed effects for the
commuting zones, including the platform wage and dummies for the task categories (with
simple tasks being the omitted category). All coefficients are in line with expectations.
Wage affects the utility of doing a task positively, while disutility increases with the
complexity of tasks. Applying Equation (3) from Section 4 to back out the wage elasticity
of labor supply, we find a moderate average wage elasticity of 0.15. In Column (2) we
interact the platform wage with the local unemployment rate. The interaction yields a
positive coefficient, implying a higher utility of wage in areas with higher unemployment.
Users from areas with high unemployment increase are thus willing to work more for
the same wage, which is in line with the fact that their opportunity cost is lower when
being unemployed. In Column (3) we instrument local unemployment with Bartik shocks.
We observe that the instrument increases the interaction of the platform wage and the
unemployment rate, but that the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is low.9 In order to account for
the low first-stage F-statistic, we also report the p-value for the Anderson-Rubin test.10
As the respective p-value is very low, this increases our trust in the instrument.
In line with expectations, labor supply in online labor becomes more elastic after
an increase in the local unemployment rate. We observe a higher valuation of wages
(higher labor supply elasticity) when the unemployment rate is high. Moreover, while the
average wage elasticity is negative when we instrument unemployment, it is positive in
the areas with higher unemployment rates. Specifically, we computed the elasticities for
9This is due to the omission of commuting zones without activity. We redid the IV estimation
including commuting zones with zero tasks performed. The respective observations are created by adding
one minute of performed work to all observations to avoid zeros. We observe that coefficients when
allowing for commuting zones without activity lie between specification (2) and (3), and the instrument
yields a considerably higher first stage F-statistic.
10For applied examples using Anderson-Rubin tests for weak-instrument robust inference see Nunn
and Qian (2014) or Asatryan et al. (2017).
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Table 4: Results on the Intensive Margin Labor Supply
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS IV
Platform wage 0.016∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.245∗∗
(0.004) (0.014) (0.104)
Medium task complexity -1.416∗∗∗ -1.403∗∗∗ -1.301∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.058)
High task complexity -2.406∗∗∗ -2.399∗∗∗ -2.344∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.073)
Unemployment X Wage 0.320∗∗ 2.873∗∗
(0.140) (1.147)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16416 16416 16416
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.25
Model fe fe iv
Kleibergen-Paap Stat 9.94
Anderson-Rubin p-val. 0.00
Wage Elasticity 0.16 0.11 -0.26
at UR < 5% 0.00 -0.99
at 5% <= UR < 10% 0.10 -0.31
at 10% <= UR < 20% 0.32 1.14
at UR >= 20% 0.62 4.39
Note: The dependent variable measures the odds-ratio of working hours on Microworkers.com.
Columns (1) and (2) are OLS fixed effects regressions and Column (3) is estimated by two stage
least squares fixed effects. Respective first stage results are provided in Table A.2. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by commuting zone and are robust to heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
several intervals and found that it is positive (and increasing) for commuting zones with
unemployment rates higher than 6.5 percent.
7 Exploring Effect Heterogeneity
7.1 Effect Heterogeneity Across Hours of the Day
While our analysis, so far, indicates that platform activity increases with a rise in
local unemployment, a remaining question is whether online labor acts primarily as a
complement or a substitute to traditional oﬄine labor in times of regional economic
downturns. In this section, we further investigate the role of online labor and study
systematically how wage elasticities change with increased unemployment across the hours
of the day. This analysis helps us to further pin down the mechanism that drives the
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findings above, because it allows us to test whether our results are indeed driven by
unemployed workers in the local labor market, rather than individuals who generally
struggle under adverse local economic conditions. If the effects we measure are driven
by unemployed workers, we expect to see larger effects of regional unemployment on
online labor supply during regular working hours. To study at which times of the day
unemployment has an effect on labor supply in the online labor market, we augment our
data set with two additional panel dimensions: the weekday and hour of the day.11 The
dependent variable is as in Subsection 6.2 the odds-ratio of working hours. In order to
increase readability, we use three hour intervals, but results do not change qualitatively
for hourly intervals.
The results for the labor supply model accounting for hours of the day are shown in
Table 5. We separately show our results for all days of the week (Col. 1-2) and then
contrast regular weekdays (Col. 3) with weekends (Col. 4). The estimates indicate that
workers have a lower valuation for the wage for working during nights after midnight and
on weekends (Col. 1). In Column 2 we add interactions of the unemployment rate with
wage and hour of the day indicators to the model, in order to investigate during which
parts of the day the effect of unemployment is strongest. The results show that users
have an increased valuation for wage between 6-12 and 18-0 when the unemployment
rate increases. Importantly, the effects are strongest in size during the morning. When
contrasting weekdays (Col. 3) and weekends (Col. 4) we see that the effect is positive in
the morning hours in both cases. However, the increase in the early morning is driven by
the activity on weekdays, whereas the wage valuation increase on the weekends starts later
in the morning and goes over noon. Overall, we find the strongest effect of unemployment
on labor supply on the platform during morning hours, which correspond with regular
working hours. Thus, rather than acting as a mere complement to oﬄine income, when
unemployment rises individuals substitute online labor for tasks they would typically
perform during regular working hours.
We graphically illustrate this finding in Figure 6. Panel B contrasts the share of reg-
11The hour of the day refers to local time, i.e. we correct server time for the respective time zone.
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Table 5: Labor Supply Model by Hour of the Day
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All During Week Weekend
Medium task complexity -1.605∗∗∗ -1.229∗∗∗ -1.302∗∗∗ -1.045∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.109) (0.114) (0.105)
High task complexity -0.765∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗ -0.768∗∗∗ -0.605∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095)
Wage 0.075∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.037 -0.039∗∗
(0.009) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020)
Wage X Hours 3-6 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.006 0.017∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Wage X Hours 6-9 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Wage X Hours 9-12 0.011∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.020 -0.038∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Wage X Hours 12-15 0.015∗∗∗ 0.002 0.007 -0.014
(0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Wage X Hours 15-18 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Wage X Hours 18-21 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007 0.005 0.014
(0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Wage X Hours 21-24 0.015∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.012∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Wage X Weekend -0.011∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003)
Wage X UR 0.840∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.202) (0.173)
Wage X UR X Hours 3-6 -0.209∗∗ -0.141 -0.420∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.105) (0.120)
Wage X UR X Hours 6-9 0.453∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.284∗
(0.141) (0.155) (0.150)
Wage X UR X Hours 9-12 0.420∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.138) (0.158)
Wage X UR X Hours 12-15 0.146 0.119 0.265∗∗
(0.101) (0.109) (0.129)
Wage X UR X Hours 15-18 -0.045 -0.079 0.086
(0.082) (0.088) (0.111)
Wage X UR X Hours 18-21 0.187∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.067
(0.081) (0.090) (0.113)
Wage X UR X Hours 21-24 0.300∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.136
(0.075) (0.085) (0.102)
Wage X UR X Weekend 0.175∗∗∗
(0.034)
Year Quarter ind. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 Overall 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.15
R2 Within 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
Observations 486814 486814 358794 128020
Note: The table shows regressions of unemployment on the activity in the online
labor market by the hour of the day. The dependent variable is the odds-ratio for
working hours. Col. 1 shows the distribution of activity across the day, and in
Columns 2-4 we introduce interactions of wage and the daily hours with unemploy-
ment. We separately show our results for all days of the week (Col. 1-2), and then
separately for regular weekdays (Col. 3) and weekends (Col. 4). Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by commuting zone and robust to heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Figure 6: Effect of Unemployment on Labor Supply by Hour of the Day
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Note: Panel A: Effect of (unemployment ∗ wage) on the odds-ratio for working
hours (relative to 0:00 omitted category). Panel B: Share of employees working
according to American Time Use Survey (ATUS) (red) and distribution of tasks
performed on Microworkers.com (blue). Over half the population is working by 8
AM (ATUS). Most activity on Microworkers.com after noon to midnight.
ular (oﬄine) employees’ working times according to American Time Use Survey (ATUS)
with the temporal distribution of the tasks performed on Microworkers.com. While more
than 60 percent of the regular employees work by 9 am in the ATUS data, the activity on
Microworkers.com peaks in the afternoon and continues until after midnight. Both dis-
tributions illustrate that the workers on Microworker.com have a different behavior than
the average working population, and they work most during afternoon and less during
the early morning. This indicates that reservation wages may be different across the day.
Panel A visualizes the respective point estimates for the interaction term between
platform wage and the local unemployment rate by the hour of the day.12 The graph
again shows that we find the overall strongest positive effect of unemployment from 7
am to 9 am and positive and statistically significant effects until 1 pm. Comparing these
positive effects with the respective ATUS data from Panel B shows that the positive effects
of unemployment on platform activity mainly arise during regular working hours in the
morning.
12The effects are derived from a regression analogous to the one in Table 5 but effects are estimated
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Figure 7: Labor Supply Elasticities by Hour of the Day
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Note: The graph shows predicted wage elasticities of labor supply over the hours
of the day for different levels of the unemployment rate. Calculations are based on
the estimation results provided in Table A.3 in the appendix.
Finally, Figure 7 visualizes the profile of the respective average labor supply elasticities
for different levels of unemployment and by the hour of the day.13 The predicted values
show that there is considerable variation in labor supply elasticities across the day. For low
local unemployment rates below 5 percent we predict negative labor supply elasticities
from 2 am until 10 am. For average unemployment rates the elasticities are strictly
positive and we find the highest elasticities in the afternoon. In line with the findings
in Table 5, the graph shows that higher unemployment rates lead to a stronger relative
increase in the wage elasticity during regular working hours in the morning.
7.2 Effect Heterogeneity Along Demographics
In this subsection we address the question how the effects of unemployment on platform
participation vary by demographics. As there is no data available to measure unemploy-
ment by demographic groups directly at the necessary observational level, we resort to
regressions in which we interact the local unemployment rate with demographics of the
total local population.
for each individual hour. The full regression results can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
13The elasticities are derived from the same regression by individual hours as the one used for Figure
6. Unemployment rates are grouped in intervals. Detailed results can be found in Table A.3 in the
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Table 6: Results for Registrations - Interactions with Demographic Variables
All Age Gender Race
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UR 1.314∗∗∗ -0.092 -55.289∗∗∗ -7.726∗∗∗
(0.508) (5.579) (12.457) (1.879)
Oﬄine wage -0.054∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
% age 15-24 (i) -6.563∗∗∗ -2.854 -6.417∗∗∗ -5.187∗∗∗
(1.558) (1.844) (1.506) (1.536)
% age 45-64 (i) -0.161 -1.304 -1.405 0.809
(1.726) (1.835) (1.686) (1.697)
% male (i) -4.215 -4.412 -11.788∗∗∗ -1.435
(4.170) (4.086) (4.181) (4.042)
% white (i) 4.336∗ 4.677∗∗ 3.579 3.758
(2.339) (2.336) (2.270) (2.333)
UR × % age 15-24 (i) -33.429∗∗∗
(12.383)
UR × % age 45-64 (i) 24.221∗∗
(9.845)
UR × % male (i) 113.160∗∗∗
(24.978)
UR × % white (i) 10.675∗∗∗
(2.177)
Constant -10.055∗∗∗ -10.648∗∗∗ -5.264 -11.620∗∗∗
(3.270) (3.193) (3.244) (3.193)
Year Quarter ind. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 Overall 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
R2 Within 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
Observations 13140 13140 13140 13140
Note: This table shows the results of regressing the number of registered
users on the local unemployment rate and local demographics. Col. 1
shows the effect on demographics on overall platform registrations. Col.
2-4 show interactions between the commuting zone unemployment rate and
the share of the demographic subgroup of interest. Col. 2 focuses on age,
Col. 3 on gender and Col. 4 on race. OLS Fixed Effects Regressions.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by commuting zone and robust
to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p
<0.01.
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Table 6 shows the results of regressing the number of user registrations on the local
unemployment rate and local demographics. The estimation results in Column 2 show
that unemployment interacted with the share of individuals in the age bracket of 45-64
years of age is positively related to new registrations on the platform, while the interaction
with the share individuals between 15 and 24 years of age is negative and significant.
Column 3 and 4 highlight that the relationship of local unemployment with registrations
is higher in regions with higher shares of males and of white individuals in the population.
Our results thus do not support the notion that OLM are particularly attractive for
young unemployed individuals, but, instead, suggest that unemployment drives platform
participation in regions with a higher share of white, male, and older population.
8 Conclusion
Online labor markets experienced considerable growth, because they offer a completely
new way in which employer-employee matches are made. In contrast to traditional oﬄine
markets, which are historically highly localized, online labor markets allow for transactions
over long distances and provide individuals on both sides of the market with the access
to a wider, potentially global pool of participants. This feature of the emerging digital
labor platforms highlights their potential to stimulate the integration of labor markets.
In this paper, we study the impact of local unemployment in the U.S. on the adoption
of and activity on a large online labor platform for microtasks (Microworkers.com). We
use internal data on platform activity by U.S. workers in the period from 2011 to 2015,
and combine them with data on regional unemployment from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. Specifically, we study the effect of regional unemployment on platform activity at
the extensive and intensive margin, by exploiting variation in unemployment at the com-
muting zone level. For identification, we apply fixed-effects panel regressions and Bartik
style instrumental variables (IV) to instrument for regional unemployment. We find that
higher commuting zone level unemployment is associated with more individuals joining
appendix.
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the platform and becoming active in fulfilling tasks (extensive margin). The number of
incumbent users engaging in tasks is unaffected though. At the intensive margin, online
labor supply becomes more elastic with higher unemployment rates. These results are
driven by a decrease of the reservation wage during standard working hours.
This paper thus provides evidence that individuals turn to online labor markets in
times of local economic hardship. It underlines pecuniary motives of platform participa-
tion and the potential of online platforms to integrate labor markets. The finding that the
online labor platform saw more registrations in times of higher unemployment indicates
that unemployed people are in principle willing to engage in online activities to achieve
income.
Our findings have two implications. First, from a managerial perspective, platform
operators should be well aware of unemployed people as potential clients of their platform
and take this into account when developing their business model. Second, policy makers
should think about possibilities to ease access to online labor markets and foster their
use. However, our findings also suggest that online labor markets, at least for microtasks,
cannot substitute oﬄine work, at least not in our period of observation. There might be
many reasons for this: First, online working in its current form might not yet be attractive
enough. This could be related, for instance, to low wages or the kind of tasks currently
offered. Second, it might well be that the amount of tasks offered is too rigid in the
short run to account for an inflow of workers, thus leading to a non-availability or at least
shortage of attractive tasks. Third, effects could be heterogeneous on circumstances.
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Appendix
Table A.1: First Stage Regression – Extensive Margin
Reg. Users Active Users
(1) (2)
Oﬄine wage -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
% age 15-24 (i) 0.068 -0.006
(0.067) (0.071)
% age 45-64 (i) -0.200∗∗∗ -0.155
(0.075) (0.094)
% male (i) 0.932∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.240)
% white (i) -0.482∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.112)
Bartik shock -0.059∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
Year Quarter ind. Yes Yes
Observations 13140 10945
Note: The table shows the first stage for the two stage least squares es-
timation results shown in Table 3. The dependent variable is the local
unemployment rate. Col. (1) provides the first stage for the analysis of
registered users. Col. (2) provides the first stage for the analysis of active
users in total, as well as newly active and old active users. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by commuting zone and robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table A.2: First Stage Regression – Intensive Margin
(1)
Medium task complexity -0.036∗∗∗
(0.002)
High task complexity -0.018∗∗∗
(0.003)
Platform wage 0.089∗∗∗
(0.002)
Platf. wage X Bartik shock -0.051∗∗∗
(0.016)
Year Quarter ind. Yes
Observations 16416
Note: The table shows the first stage for the two stage least squares estima-
tion results shown in Table 4. The dependent variable is the platform wage
interacted with the local unemployment rate. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are clustered by commuting zone and robust to heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table A.3: Labor Supply Model by Individual Hour of the Day
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All During Week Weekend
Platform wage -0.043∗ -0.032 -0.033 -0.053∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
Wage X UR 1.040∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.194) (0.204) (0.212)
Wage X Hour 1 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.011
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
Wage X Hour 2 -0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.011 0.039∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Wage X Hour 3 -0.014∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.006 0.037∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Wage X Hour 4 -0.021∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.005 0.033∗∗
(0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
Wage X Hour 5 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.023∗ 0.023
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Wage X Hour 6 -0.028∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.004) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
Wage X Hour 7 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.028
(0.005) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Wage X Hour 8 -0.012∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.005) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Wage X Hour 9 -0.003 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.025
(0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Wage X Hour 10 0.007∗ -0.019 -0.017 -0.026
(0.004) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018)
Wage X Hour 11 0.009∗∗ -0.016 -0.016 -0.020
(0.004) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Wage X Hour 12 0.008∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.015 -0.013
(0.003) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Wage X Hour 13 0.008∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001 -0.005
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Wage X Hour 14 0.010∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.014
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Wage X Hour 15 0.016∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.020
(0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Wage X Hour 16 0.019∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.024∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
Wage X Hour 17 0.021∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Wage X Hour 18 0.022∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.010 0.038∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Wage X Hour 19 0.017∗∗∗ 0.008 0.002 0.030∗∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Wage X Hour 20 0.011∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.010 0.016
(0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
Wage X Hour 21 0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.023∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
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Wage X Hour 22 0.010∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.009 0.031∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Wage X Hour 23 0.007∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Wage X Weekend -0.011∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003)
Wage X UR X Hour 1 -0.093 -0.086 -0.113
(0.094) (0.100) (0.180)
Wage X UR X Hour 2 -0.179 -0.059 -0.562∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.131) (0.163)
Wage X UR X Hour 3 -0.259∗∗ -0.143 -0.609∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.133) (0.169)
Wage X UR X Hour 4 -0.360∗∗ -0.261∗ -0.676∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.158) (0.208)
Wage X UR X Hour 5 -0.211 -0.098 -0.549∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.168) (0.202)
Wage X UR X Hour 6 0.103 0.156 -0.072
(0.155) (0.182) (0.205)
Wage X UR X Hour 7 0.436∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.177) (0.190) (0.227)
Wage X UR X Hour 8 0.534∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.290
(0.172) (0.187) (0.191)
Wage X UR X Hour 9 0.420∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.227
(0.153) (0.163) (0.223)
Wage X UR X Hour 10 0.318∗∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.405∗
(0.138) (0.143) (0.214)
Wage X UR X Hour 11 0.315∗∗ 0.306∗∗ 0.352∗
(0.139) (0.154) (0.180)
Wage X UR X Hour 12 0.269∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.235
(0.127) (0.137) (0.178)
Wage X UR X Hour 13 0.104 0.095 0.151
(0.112) (0.131) (0.159)
Wage X UR X Hour 14 -0.100 -0.083 -0.115
(0.107) (0.122) (0.146)
Wage X UR X Hour 15 -0.196∗ -0.213∗ -0.119
(0.109) (0.125) (0.145)
Wage X UR X Hour 16 -0.104 -0.083 -0.143
(0.102) (0.103) (0.177)
Wage X UR X Hour 17 -0.041 -0.038 -0.021
(0.096) (0.104) (0.153)
Wage X UR X Hour 18 0.062 0.144 -0.176
(0.084) (0.098) (0.156)
Wage X UR X Hour 19 0.118 0.200∗∗ -0.149
(0.084) (0.098) (0.162)
Wage X UR X Hour 20 0.185∗∗ 0.255∗∗ -0.016
(0.088) (0.102) (0.169)
Wage X UR X Hour 21 0.312∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ -0.048
(0.084) (0.093) (0.152)
Wage X UR X Hour 22 0.116 0.228∗∗ -0.231
(0.089) (0.111) (0.149)
Wage X UR X Hour 23 0.274∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.154
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(0.090) (0.094) (0.152)
Wage X UR X Weekend 0.174∗∗∗
(0.034)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 Overall 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.15
R2 Within 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
Observations 486814 486814 358794 128020
Note: The table shows regressions of unemployment on the activity in the online
labor market by the hour of the day. The dependent variable is the odds-ratio for
working hours. Col. 1 shows the distribution of activity across the day, and in
Columns 2-4 we introduce interactions of wage and the daily hours with unemploy-
ment. We separately show our results for all days of the week (Col. 1-2), and then
separately for regular weekdays (Col. 3) and weekends (Col. 4). Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by commuting zone and robust to heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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